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Chapter 1. Introduction
1 Analysis of Public Procurement
Public sector procurement makes up a substantial part of GDP: 10   20%.1 Ocials in public sectors
are concerned not only with the procurement costs but also with the quality of work. As a result,
value for money, which is a program about the eective use of government spending to improve
the quality of work, has started to become common worldwide. Moreover, the government cares
about the worsening of the quality of work due to the lack of new participants' experience in the
case of relaxing the regulations of new entry. Cost overruns, which are prevalent in public-works
procurement, are considered to be necessary to ensure safety for the execution of projects. Therefore,
we empirically examine the eects of various types of systems used in public procurement in terms
of price and quality. In particular, we focus on auction mechanisms in this dissertation.
In this dissertation, we adopt structural auction models and the program evaluation approach to
quantitatively assess the eects of dierent auction mechanisms. The structural estimation approach
is the method of estimating economic agents' parameters based on a theoretical model and simulat-
ing counterfactual scenarios which are absent in real-world. This approach enables us to compare
between actual and counterfactual scenarios. In addition, the structural estimation approach averts
Lucas critique which refers to the changes in preferences of economic agents due to policy changes
and considers reduced-form estimations implausible. However, this approach tends to make strong
assumptions on the theoretical model to estimate the parameters. In contrast to the structural estima-
tion approach, the program evaluation approach enables us to assess the impacts of policy changes
without imposing strong assumptions. We exploit exogenous sources of variation to identify the
causal evidence on the impacts of policy changes. However, the program evaluation methods do not
recover economic agent's structural parameters or simulate scenarios which are absent in real-world.
Since the two estimation approaches have both advantages and disadvantages, we properly use the
approaches depending on the situations.
This dissertation consists of three analyses. In Chapter 2, we examine the impacts of scoring
auctions over (standard) price-only auctions through a structural auction model. In Chapter 3, we
study the eects of relaxing entry regulations in public procurement auctions under a scoring design
in terms of price and quality. For this empirical analysis, we exploit the methods of the program
evaluation. In Chapter 4, we investigate the impacts of cost overruns on the quality of work and
1See http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/govpro.html
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social welfare based on a structural estimation model. For our empirical analysis, we exploit a data
set obtained from the record of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation (the MLIT)
in Japan. The data set includes not only bids and the number of bidders but also the nal payments
determined after the completion of work and information on the quality of work reviewed at the time
of completion.
2 Analysis of Scoring Auctions
Scoring auctions have recently started to become common worldwide. In a (standard) price-only
auction, bidders submit price bids and the winner is the bidder with the lowest price bid among all
the submitted price bids. In a scoring auction, bidders submit not only price bids but also quality bids
as their bids. Prior to auction, the government announces a scoring rule which is the way to rank
dierent bids. The quality bid consists of non-monetary attributes such as the time to completion.
The government evaluates the bids and awards the contract to the bidder with the best combination
(score) of the price bid and the quality bid. Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008) show that a
scoring auction with a quasi-linear scoring rule gives incentive for bidders to improve the quality of
work and welfare gain in comparison with price-only auctions. In spite of the prevalence of scoring
auctions, the quantitative evaluations of scoring auctions in comparison with price-only auctions are
limited with the exception of Lewis and Bajari (2011). Therefore, it is necessary to assess the impacts
of scoring auctions over price-only auctions.
Chapter 2, which provides the quantitative evaluations of scoring auctions over price-only auc-
tions, is titled as The Impact of Scoring Auctions in Public Procurement: Empirical Analysis. We
develop a structural model to quantify the benets of scoring auctions over price-only auctions and
estimate it using a dataset of price-only auctions including information on the quality of work in each
contract. Our approach proposed in this analysis enables us to achieve the identication of various
types of cost functions and the nonparametric identication of cost functions of quality levels when
the sample size is large
In this analysis, we provide two sources of the potential benets of implementing scoring auctions
and quantify their eects. The rst is the cost structures of improving the quality of work. The second
is the government's uncertainty of the winning bidders' private information which is included in the
cost functions. We compare large-scale and complex projects with small-scale and simple projects,
for example, constructing a bridge and painting work on the road. Theoretical and empirical studies
show that for the procurement of complex projects, price-only auctions may not work well due to the
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lack of contractors' expertise about construction practices. We assess the eects of scoring auctions
for the two work projects which dier in the complexity and the size of a project.
We show that under scoring auctions, the quality of work improves by more than 10% and so-
cial welfare increases by about 2   7%. The impacts of scoring auctions are larger for bridge work
compared with painting work. The government is faced with more uncertainty for bridge work.
3 Analysis of Eects of Relaxing Entry Regulations in Public
Procurement under a Scoring Design
Entry regulations are common in many markets including public procurement. The government is
concerned not only with the prices but also with the quality levels. In particular, in public-works
procurement, ocials in the government seem to believe that restricting participants in auctions can
ensure ex post performance including the quality of work which is aected by both the uncertainty at
the time of bidding and the moral hazard problem during construction. When the government relaxes
entry regulations, many new rms enter a market. Large participation in the market can promote
competition and reduce prices, but the new rms possibly supply poor-quality goods due to the lack
of their experience. However, with the exception of Coviello, Guglielmo and Spagnolo (2014) and
Decarolis (2014), there is still a scarcity of empirical research that considers ex post performance to
quantify the impacts of the promotion of competition in public procurement. Therefore, it is important
to quantify the impacts of relaxing entry regulations in terms of both price and quality in public-works
procurement.
We show the quantitative evaluations of relaxing entry regulations under scoring auctions. Scoring
auctions can give incentives for contractors to utilize their expertise and induce competition for not
only the prices but also the designs. However, the government possibly manipulates the outcomes of
scoring auctions through the manipulations of evaluating the quality bids submitted by bidders. In this
case, relaxing entry regulations under scoring auctions comes to naught. However, in real-world, we
do not know which eects strongly arise because of the scarcity of the empirical analysis of scoring
auctions. Therefore, we provide empirical evidence on the eects of relaxing entry regulations under
a scoring design.
Chapter 3 titled as The Eects of Relaxing Entry Regulations on Price and Quality: Evidence
from Public Procurement Auctions provides quantitative evaluations for the benets of open auctions
over invited auctions under a scoring design to investigate the eects of relaxing entry regulations in
terms of price and quality. In public-works procurement, invited auctions lead to repeated partici-
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pation of particular rms to ensure the quality of work, while open auctions relax entry regulations
to enhance competition and reduce price. We exploit a nationwide policy change and data including
information on ex post performance in Japan. We show that under a scoring design, open auctions
reduce cost overruns and delay in completion by more than 10% without worsening the quality of
work.
4 Analysis of Impacts of Cost Overruns
In public-works procurement, cost overruns frequently arise because the winning bids are dierent
from the nal payments due to the presence of unanticipated productivity shocks during construction.
However, with the exception of Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2014) and Miller (2014), there is still
a scarcity of the structural model of bidding which incorporates the presence of the cost overrun and
the execution of the project during construction into the model. Moreover, the empirical analysis of
the moral hazard problem in public procurement is limited except for Lewis and Bajari (2014).
Chapter 4 titled as Contractual Incompleteness and the Quality of Construction Works in Public-
works Procurement: Empirical Analysis provides a structural auction model which incorporates the
cost overrun and the choice of the quality level by the contractor during construction. In the model,
similar to McAfee and McMillan (1986), the government provides a linear payment schedule which
consists of its bid and the cost overrun. In an auction, bidders submit bids and the bidder with the low-
est bid receives the contract. The cost overrun arises during construction and is an incentive scheme
to ensure the quality of work. This situation is close to the moral hazard because the cost overrun im-
proves the contractor's eort level for the quality of work. We quantify the impacts of cost overruns on
the quality of construction works and social welfare by using a data set including information on the
nal payment and the quality of work reviewed after the completion. In counterfactual experiments,
we nd that the welfare loss is 40% when cost overruns are reduced by 50%.
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